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LVAD as Destination Therapy - The Economic Dilemma
Abstract
The artificial heart, after decades of development, remains a long way off as a practical remedy for people with
failing hearts. But a related technology, the left ventricular assist device (LVAD), has passed major milestones
in its development and is poised for widespread use. This technology, which is an offshoot of the artificial
heart program, may well have greater impact on society than the artificial heart. It is time to consider its
probable costs to society. A heart transplant is the present treatment of choice for end-stage heart failure
(ESHF).
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© PHOTODISC
The artificial heart, afterdecades of develop-ment, remains a longway off as a practicalremedy for people with
failing hearts. But a related technolo-
gy, the Left Ventricular Assist Device
(LVAD), has passed major mile-
stones in its development and is
poised for widespread use. This tech-
nology, which is an offshoot of the
artificial heart program, may well
have greater impact on society than
the artificial heart. It is time to con-
sider its probable costs to society.
With about 550 000 new cases
and 1 million hospitalizations a year
in the United States alone, conges-
tive heart failure is a major health
problem and a major cause of death
among the elderly. The 4.7 million
Americans with mild to severe heart
failure face a five-year mortality rate
of 50% [1]. Advanced heart failure,
experienced by 250 000 Americans,
is a debilitating condition whose
outcome for the patient is grim.
A heart transplant is the present
treatment of choice for end-stage
heart failure (ESHF). In part because
of a lack of donors, only 3000 heart
transplants are performed each year
worldwide (two thirds of them in the
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United States); 15 000 patients are
on waiting lists for transplants.
Because of lack of donors, these
numbers are not likely to increase
substantially in the future.
Enter the LVAD 
For many years, physicians have
dreamed of replacing the failing
heart with a mechanical pump. The
most visible work along these lines
has been the development of the
total artificial heart (TAH), which
was spurred by massive investments
by the Artificial Heart Program, a
U.S. program chartered in 1964 by
the National Heart, Lung and Blood
Institute (NHLBI), part of the
National Institutes of Health. 
As an offshoot of the artificial
heart program, the NHLBI funded
the development of ventricular sup-
port systems, which do not replace
the heart entirely but assist it in
pumping blood. The first ventricular
support system was used in a human
in 1963. Mechanical support sys-
tems, notably the Left Ventricular
Assist Device (LVAD), came into
frequent use in the 1980s as heart
transplants became increasingly pop-
ular and the need arose to support the
hearts of patients awaiting transplant. 
LVADs typically bypass the left
ventricle (which carries about 80%
of the load of the heart) and pump
blood directly into the aorta, from
which it enters the systematic circu-
lation. More recent systems also
assist the right ventricle (which
pumps blood through the lungs) as
well. The devices are either implant-
ed entirely within the body with
power lines and an air vent brought
outside the body through the skin,
or their pumps are located outside
the body and connected to the heart
and large blood vessels with tubes
passing through the chest. Fig. 1
shows an LVAD of the first type, the
HeartMate (Thoratec Corporation,
Pleasanton CA). 
LVAD as Bridge to Transplant
With the growing success of heart
transplants, the need arose to sustain
patients on a temporary basis until
they could receive heart transplants,
a role that the LVAD serves well.
The FDA approved the first LVAD
for use as “bridge to transplant” in
1994. At present, five different
LVADs are on the market and sever-
al others are in advanced develop-
ment stages. The FDA has never
approved a TAH except for use in
clinical trials.
By limiting approving of LVADs
for sale as a bridge to transplant, the
FDA restricted the device to a very
small market consisting of, at most, a
few thousand patients eligible for
heart transplants, which is a small
fraction of individuals suffering from
end-stage heart failure. Consequent-
ly, medical device companies have
undertaken studies to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the LVAD for use
in patients who are ineligible for a
heart transplant because of
old age, other serious ill-
nesses, or simply resi-
dence too far from a hos-
pital capable of
performing heart trans-
plants. For such patients
the LVAD would be “des-
tination therapy,” just as a
pacemaker is destination
therapy for heart arrhyth-
mias.
As destination therapy
for end-stage heart fail-
ure, the safety and effec-
tiveness of the LVAD would have to
be compared to that of the presently
accepted treatment using drugs.
Important evidence came in 2001
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Fig. 1. Thoratec HeartMate® XVE left ventricular assist system. Reprinted with
permission from Thoratec Corporation. 
Only 3000 heart
transplants are
performed each year
worldwide; 15 000
patients are on
waiting lists for
transplants.
IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE  |  SUMMER 2004 |  25
with the publication of a long-await-
ed study that was jointly sponsored
by the NHLBI and the Thoratec
Corporation [2]. This landmark
study, known as the Randomized
Evaluation of Mechanical Assis-
tance for the Treatment of Conges-
tive Heart Failure (REMATCH)
study, compared the outcomes of
129 patients with end-stage heart
failure who were ineligible for a
heart transplant. Sixty-nine of these
patients received a LVAD (Heart-
Mate VE) and the other 61 were
treated by drugs alone. The results
were dramatic. The median survival
time was 408 days in the device
group and only 150 days in the med-
ical-therapy group (Fig. 2).
There were, however, numerous
serious complications from use of
the LVAD (Table I). More than a
quarter of the patients contracted
serious infections from the device
within three months after implanta-
tion, and by the end of two years
more than one-third of the devices
had failed [7]. However, only one
patient with the LVAD died of left
ventricular dysfunction, a cause of
death in fifty of the control
patients. Thus, despite its high
failure rate and numerous compli-
cations, the LVAD increased the
two-year survival rate of these
very ill patients. Is this
REMATCH success story con-
vincing enough?
Apparently it was. On Novem-
ber 6, 2002, the FDA approved the
HeartMate LVAD to “be implant-
ed permanently in certain termi-
nally ill patients who are not eligi-
ble for heart transplant.” Noting
the “serious side effects associated
with the device,” the FDA limited
approval of the device for use with
patients with severe ESHF. The
Agency estimated that between 
20 000 and 30 000 people a year
could benefit from the device. The
device has been marketed in Europe
both as a bridge and an alternative to
transplant since 1994.
There is, in fact, good reason to
believe that the LVAD might benefit
a far larger patient population than
those with ESHF, including patients
after myocardial infarction, or suf-
fering from postsurgical cardiac
failure, acute myocarditis, or dilated
cardiomyopathy. By “unloading”
the heart, the LVAD reduces the
pressures on the heart, providing a
“bridge to recovery” [3]. Many of
these patients can subsequently be
weaned from the LVAD. And also,
by increasing cardiac output, the
LVAD can lead to dramatic
improvements in patients with heart
failure, at least for the short term. 
How Much Will It Cost?
Implantation of a LVAD, and asso-
ciated medical care, is very expen-
sive. Moskowitz et al. [4] reported
that the first-year cost of LVAD
implantation is presently $220 000,
which includes $141 000 for the ini-
tial implant related hospitalization
and $67 000 for the cost of the de-
vice. This is comparable to the cost
of a heart transplant – and far more
than drug therapy for heart failure.
As the technology improves, the
costs of the device will surely
decline. But also, as the devices
improve, the risk/benefit
calculations of patients
and their physicians will
change, and their usage
will increase.
By expanding the
indications for use of the
LVAD, the FDA will cre-
ate a rapidly growing
market for the devices.
When FDA approval was
limited to use as a bridge
to transplant, the market
for the device (at least in
the United States) was
limited to the number of
patients eligible for heart transplants,
which is in turn is limited by the
availability of donors. Approval for
marketing as destination therapy for
ESHF patients who are not candi-
dates for heart transplant greatly
expanded its market. Any future
approval for use with less severely ill
patients as a bridge to recovery will
result in further expansion. 
Estimates for the ultimate size of
the market for the LVAD in the
The LVAD has 
been marketed 
in Europe both 
as a bridge and 
as an alternative 
to transplant 
since 1994.
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Fig. 2. Analysis of survival of patients in the REMATCH study [2]. Reprinted with
permission.
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United States vary considerably.
Moskowitz et al. [4] projected that
there will be 35 000–75 000 candi-
dates for LVADs per year by 2020.
An investment firm recently predict-
ed that the size of the American
market for LVADs would be 100
000 units per year if the devices
were approved as a “bridge to
recovery” [5]. Indeed, the number
of firms developing such devices is
a measure of their optimism about
the future growth of the market.
The aggregate costs of wide-
spread usage of the LVAD could be
staggering. At $220 000 per patient,
a market of 100 000 devices per
year would correspond to an aggre-
gate medical bill of $22B per year in
present dollars – just for the costs of
implantation and first year care of
the patients. 
Economic Dilemma
The LVAD is a life-giving technology,
but its aggregate costs to society could
become daunting. Medicare has long
covered LVAD therapy as bridge-to-
transplant. On November 19, 2003,
the Centers for Medicare and Medic-
aid Services announced that Medicare
will cover the cost of implantation of
FDA-approved LVADs as destination
therapy for patients who do not meet
eligibility requirements for cardiac
transplantation.
Dialysis provides a good exam-
ple of the ability of a new technolo-
gy to incur costs that far exceed
original projections. In 1972 the
U.S. Congress agreed to include
dialysis for patients with end-stage
renal disease in Medicare. The best
projections at that time were that the
program would serve 10 000
patients, at a cost of $250 M per
year. Today, the program serves
more than 20 times this number, at a
cost (in present dollars) of $14B per
year. While the costs of dialysis (on
a per-patient basis) declined in real
terms, the demand for treatments far
exceeded initial projections. 
Government is thus faced with a
dilemma. It is clearly unacceptable
to deny patients a lifesaving treat-
ment (such as dialysis or LVAD).
But the aggregate costs of such
treatments can potentially become
high enough to have adverse effects
in other areas of social welfare. 
This same point, from a different
perspective, was made in a recent
essay entitled “Too Much of a Good
Thing: How Splendid Technologies
Can Go Wrong” by ethicist Daniel
Callahan, who argued that “equity
and technological progress are on a
profound collision course” [6]
because of the impossibility of pro-
viding both endless high-tech med-
ical services and ensuring equitable
care to the entire population. The
issue is fundamentally one of jus-
tice: what does a just society pro-
vide to its members according to
what priorities?
This conflict appeared, for exam-
ple in 1987, when the Oregon legis-
lature voted to discontinue its Med-
icaid organ transplant coverage for
an estimated 34 recipients over 2
years at an estimated cost of 2.2 mil-
lion dollars to provide basic health
care for approximately 1500 low-
income children and pregnant
women. Then governor, Neil Gold-
schmidt, stated when he signed the
bill into law, “How can we spend
every nickel in support of a few peo-
ple when thousands never see a doc-
tor or eat a decent meal?”
This dilemma is also seen in the
41 million American citizens who
lack health insurance, and receive
basic health services on a hit-or-
miss basis (if at all). Government
has been unable to extend health
insurance to these people. One
notable attempt was in President
Clinton’s unsuccessful campaign
for health care reform early in his
Presidency. Clinton’s plan
foundered in part because middle-
class Americans feared that univer-
sal health coverage would mean, for
them, loss of coverage for high-tech
medical services. “Because the mid-
dle classes will not tolerate restric-
tions on access to [medical] tech-
nologies," historian David Rothman
pointed out [7], "the lower classes
are left to fend for themselves."
A recent estimate of the costs of
extending health insurance to all
Americans was provided in a 2003
plan proposed by the Common-
wealth Fund (a New York founda-
tion), which was projected to cost
the federal government $70B [8].
Given the present economic cli-
mate, the prospects of such a plan
are very dim indeed. With the
LVAD, the camel’s nose is already
under the tent, and U.S. federal and
state governments could easily incur
annual costs of tens of billions of
dollars in coming years. This may
be a good example of the “collision
TABLE I CAUSES OF DEATH OF PATIENTS ENROLLED IN THE REMATCH 
STUDY
Cause of Death Medical Therapy LVAD Total
Group Group
Number of Patients
Left ventricular dysfunction 50 1 51
Sepsis 1 17 18
Failure of LVAD 0 7 7
Miscellaneous 
noncardiovascular causes 0 5 5
Pulmonary embolism 0 2 2
Acute myocardial infarction 1 0 1
Cardiac procedure 1 0 1
Perioperative bleeding 0 1 1
Unknown 0 2 2
Total 54 41 95
From [2]. Reprinted with permission.
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course” that Callahan describes. But
the collision is indirect: by pushing
up costs of health care, the LVAD
(and other expensive technologies)
will make it even harder to extend
health insurance to all Americans.
Other countries take a different
approach. England restricts con-
sumption of high-tech medical ser-
vices by, in effect, rationing medical
care (except for those with the abil-
ity to pay for private care). But these
countries are also facing the
prospect of unsustainable medical
costs. Can even wealthy societies
afford the splendid technology of
modern medicine?
The LVAD is truly a splendid
technology, a product of the artifi-
cial heart program developed with-
out the hoopla that accompanied the
artificial heart. But it creates a
dilemma that will also arise with
other artificial organs that may be
developed in the future: the treat-
ment costs are very high, there are
many potential users, and the avail-
ability of the devices (unlike those
of organs for transplant) is essential-
ly unlimited. To paraphrase Calla-
han’s question: at what point does a
new medical technology become
too much of a good thing?
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LETTERS (continued from page 5)
Reply by Chester Smith
I agree with Mr. Avishay Gordon that the term “gueril-
la” is not exactly what we need to describe internation-
al activists who have resorted to terrorism from time to
time. Actually the Al-Qaeda people have targeted the
overthrow of the Saudi Royal family and they do,
indeed, have in-country activity with that objective in
view. In that sense they might be classifed as “gueril-
las,” but their operations in the international scene
exceed the classic narrow definition normally used.
We do not have a clear idea of what motivates these
people and our present administration seems to have no
interest in finding out. Simply labeling them “bad guys”
is not helpful. American interest in the Middle East is
primarily economic. “Terrorist” action is an attention
getter and in some ways resembles a call for third-par-
ty nations to “back off.” The apparently  religio-politi-
cal agenda  takes these organizations out of the pure ter-
rorism-for-its-own-sake category. At the moment we do
not have a properly descriptive term for them. Perhaps
Mr Gordon can suggest one.
Under the restricted definition Mr Gordon proposes,
the Palestinian suicide people qualify as guerilla fighters
not terrorists on the basis of motivation and not method.
Clearly their objective is to reclaim their land from what
appears to them to be an occupation by a non-Asiatic
(e.g., European/American) culture that was imposed
during the first half of the twentieth century. There is no
solution to that situation that fails to recognize the essen-
tial religio-cultural character of the conflict.
“Terrorism” as such relies on the dramatic and may
be entirely idiosycratic as in the  Timothy McVey case
and  the Oklahoma Federal Building episode. Al Qaeda
and other similar groups appear to have definite objec-
tives in view and may or may not use terrorism to
accomplish them. If nothing else works, give your
opponent a bloody a nose. 
The intent of the original piece was to show the
incredible efficiency of this type of activity in terms of
results versus investment. Evidently there is no quarrel
with that premise. My thanks to Mr Gordon. It is nice
to know that somebody actually read the article and
thought enough to critique the terminology. 
Chester L. Smith
Bedford, MA U.S.A.
Clsmith82@comcast.net
